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Introduction
Joanna Baillie (1762–1851) and her works have long lain outside the cen‑
tre of literary studies. However, if we were to judge by her presence in 
anthologies of literature, she has recently (“been”) moved closer to the 
centre; we can now find her poems in The Norton Anthology  of  English 
Literature, and the Broadview Anthology  of  Romantic  Drama contains 
her 1812 “Gothic” play Orra. Broadview has, besides, published a criti‑
cal edition of the first collection, published originally in an anonymous 
volume in 1798, of Plays on the Passions (see references for details), a wri‑
ting project that extended over a number of years. Apart from numerous 
theses devoted to particular aspects of Baillie’s work, there is – among 
other books – a new critical biography (Judith Bailey Slagle’s Joanna Bail‑
lie, a Literary Life) and a copious two ‑volume edition of her letters.
There is a larger context to this reclaiming and restitution: “Over the 
past two decades,” – writes Jonathan Mulrooney – “scholars of British 
theatre in the long eighteenth century have produced some of the most 
imaginative and exciting work in contemporary cultural studies” (249). 
What we have been witnessing for some time now can be described 
as the “de ‑peripherisation” of romantic drama, and of female roman‑
tic drama in particular. Thanks to this process, Baillie now – once more 
– occupies centre stage. In other words, she has largely reclaimed the 
position she held two hundred years ago.
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This article is another attempt at de ‑peripherisation, but also at 
making central an issue that cultural ‑studies ‑oriented scholars have cho‑
sen to ignore. I examine here three ways in which the drama of Baillie is 
related to the imagination; this means that I pick up a problem that may 
seem peripheral in drama and theatre studies, but one which, as we 
shall see, is central to the theoretical concerns with which Baillie occu‑
pied herself in her dramaturgy.
In what follows I address two major concerns: philosophical (epi‑
stemological and moral) and (meta) theatrical. The larger philosophi‑
cal context involves the philosophy of the mind (chiefly Scottish) as an 
influence on Baillie’s drama. This epistemological aspect of the relation 
between the passions and the imagination is tightly intertwined with 
some moral ramifications: the troubled – and even potentially cata‑
strophic – relation between the imagination and the passions supplied 
sources for the conflicts that Baillie represented (“staged”), or, as we 
might put it, “studied” in her plays.
If a philosophy of the mind, with an inseparable moral dimension, 
informs Baillie’s dramaturgy, this philosophy has necessarily undergone 
a transmutation due to the way in which Baillie, as her project of “plays 
on the passions” compelled her to, needed to work out a manner of sho‑
wing the workings of the imagination on the stage. Especially interest‑
ing in this context are cases of pathological tensions between the private 
and the public spheres, tensions that arise from the process whereby 
philosophical introversion has to be transmuted into theatrical inter‑
personality and sociability.1 The relationship between the broader phi‑
losophical framework of Baillie’s work and the way in which it is put to 
use in drama, and thus given a largely novel theatrical facet, cannot be 
an easy one to unravel. As we shall see, there is indeed some variance 
between the conceptual and theatrical contexts of her engagement with 
the passions and the imagination.
1 This is to be taken in a double sense, because we have to distinguish between
(1) the social world portrayed in drama from (2) the performance as a social event. Bail‑
lie consistently devised her plays as “acting plays,” i.e., ones intended for performance, 
no matter how critical she was with the actual conditions of staging in the London royal 
theatres.
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Baillie and the Passions
Long forgotten but recently rediscovered, Joanna Baillie’s plays – and 
the project they represented – earned her once the reputation of a play‑
wright who revived the tradition of serious or legitimate drama. An 
anecdote frequently quoted by those few scholars who have published 
on Baillie features Lord Byron, with whom Baillie was a great favourite 
(“there are fine things in all the Plays on the Passions,” qtd. in Brewer, 
167): in response to Voltaire’s supposition that “the composition of a tra‑
gedy requires testicles,” Byron wrote: “If this be true Lord knows what 
Joanna Baillie does – I suppose she borrows them.”2 As we shall see, 
Baillie encroached also upon another supposedly male terrain, that of 
philosophy. Even though she was not unanimously extolled by her con‑
temporaries, praise was often heard. For instance, in 1802 (Baillie having 
turned forty, with decades of active life awaiting her) a critic wrote that 
“even if her pen were now to be inactive … [she] would be always cele‑
brated among the brightest luminaries of the present period” (qtd., after 
a reviewer in the British Critic, in Slagle, 95). In the words of her friend, 
Sir Walter Scott, Baillie was “the best dramatic writer whom Britain 
has produced since the days of Shakespeare and Massinger” (qtd. in 
Brewer, 166).3
Baillie made her debut as a playwright in 1798 with an anonymous 
publication of three plays (the full title of the book reads A Series of 
Plays:  In  Which  It  Is  Attempted  to  Delineate  the  Stronger  Passions  of  the 
Mind. Each Passion Being the Subject of a Tragedy and a Comedy).4 The pro‑
ject, as it was originally devised, involved the composition of two plays, 
a comedy and a tragedy, on each of the major passions (love, hate, ambi‑
tion, fear, hope, remorse, jealousy, pride, envy, revenge, anger, joy, grief) 
(Duthie, 24).5 The 1798 publication contained two tragedies, one on love 
2 Byron’s letter to John Murray (Venice, April 2nd 1817): Byron 1976, 203. Italics and 
punctuation according to the source publication.
3 Like Byron, Scott showed some eagerness in getting Baillie’s plays staged.
4 Earlier, in 1790, Baillie published, also anonymously, some poetry.
5 As Duthie points out, by 1812 Baillie had changed her original plan, explaining that 
joy, grief, and anger were “too transient,” pride “dull,” and envy “too disgusting in Tra‑
gedy,” and to be endured only in “Comedy or Farce.” Being thus left with remorse, jealousy, 
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and the other on hatred, and a comedy on love. Significantly, it was pre‑
faced by an essay entitled “Introductory Discourse,” in which Baillie 
presented her theory of drama based on the notion of “sympathetick 
[sic] curiosity.”
Engagements with the philosophy of the human mind can be found in 
all thirteen of her plays on the passions. As we shall see on the example 
of the plays discussed below, these engagements necessitated a preoccu‑
pation with the imagination. Like the philosophy of her times that inspi‑
red her, Baillie’s interest in the strong passions obliged her to explore 
the links between those and the imagination. This is perhaps most con‑
spicuous in her two plays on the passion of fear, Orra and The Dream 
(both published in 1812).
In Orra, the title heroine’s irrational, indeed pathological, fear of the 
supernatural, described as “the secret weakness of her mind” (90),6 is 
cause of her madness in bizarre if not somewhat ridiculous circumstan‑
ces; she loses her mind in the moment when she is about to be rescued 
from imprisonment in a gloomy castle. Her hyperactive imagination is 
the immediate cause of her death: “Her mind within itself holds a dark 
world/Of dismal phantasies and horrid forms!” (152). The hero of The 
Dream, “imperial general” Osterloo dies of fear a minute before an order 
is delivered to prevent his execution. Osterloo’s mind has been agita‑
ted into frenzy, not so much by a presentiment of imminent death, as 
by thoughts on the abyss of an Unknown Beyond that death opens. As 
he describes it: when the mind tries to apprehend death, it finds itself 
suspended over a yawning gulf of “the unknown, the unbounded, the 
unfathomable” (188). In both these instances, Baillie gives an excrucia‑
ting examination of what in the playtext of The Dream is described as the 
and revenge, she subsequently deleted revenge from her plan as a passion which is “fre‑
quently exposed.” She realised her project, in this curtailed form, over a period of almost 
30 years (1798–1836), and the three volumes which belong to the “series” include: Count 
Basil (a tragedy on love), The Tryal (a comedy on love), De Monfort (a tragedy on hate), The 
Election (a comedy on hatred), Ethwald (a tragedy on ambition; in two parts), The Second 
Marriage (a comedy on ambition), Orra (a tragedy on fear, of the supernatural), The Dream 
(a tragedy on fear, of death), The Siege (a comedy on fear), The Beacon (a musical drama 
on hope), Romiero (a tragedy on jealousy), The Alienated Manor (a comedy on jealousy), 
and Henriquez (a tragedy on remorse). See the “Chronology” section in Duthie’s edition.
6 All citations, by page number, to these two plays are to Baillie 2007.
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“inward agonies of imagination” (187). As we have already suggested, 
we may speak here of attempts at bringing forth, at putting on display 
what naturally remains hidden from view. To put it differently, Baillie’s 
goal is to address anew and redefine the customary relation between 
within and without in drama; while traditionally the outside (mime, 
actions, etc.: a play’s mimetic, stagey content) are for the audience the 
indices of mental goings ‑on, Baillie’s goal is to, as it were, stage the mind. 
The audience’s interest is to be directed to the inner workings of the 
human mind as the source and cause of events represented on the stage. 
Taking into account the larger context, which we shall examine subse‑
quently, Baillie’s project of “plays on the passions” consists in combining 
dramaturgy and the philosophy of the mind. And so, before we examine 
in more detail the two earliest tragedies on the passions (De Monfort and 
Count Basil), we discuss briefly that philosophical context.
The Epistemology of Sympathy
That modern philosophy in Britain was occupied with passions beco‑
mes obvious not only when we look into John Locke’s Essay Concerning 
Human  Understanding; significant for the history of this problematic 
is also Francis Hutcheson’s critique of Thomas Hobbes’s and Bernard 
Mandeville’s views on man’s supposed natural selfishness. Hutcheson 
contributed in this way to the development of what we may call the 
moral branch of English empiricism, which worked out a theory of sym‑
pathy. In her introduction of the first series of Plays on the Passions, Joanna 
Baillie makes use of the term “sympathetic curiosity,” which reveals her 
debt, not only to the philosophy of the human mind in general but also 
and chiefly to this philosophy’s contribution to ethics, namely the way it 
assisted in the fashioning of a system of morals. In what follows in this 
section, we look chiefly at the philosophers who represent what came to 
be called the Scottish Enlightenment.7
7 The term was coined in 1900 by William Robert Scott (in reference to Hutcheson) “to 
designate the great eighteenth ‑century flowering of moral philosophy and the human 
sciences in the university towns of Lowland Scotland.” (Manning et al., 71). See also 
Introduction to Broadie 2007.
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Besides Hutcheson (1694–1746), the main representatives were David 
Hume (1711–1776), Adam Smith (1723–1790), Thomas Reid (1710–1796) and 
Dugald Stewart (1753–1828). To Stewart and his Elements of the Philosophy 
of  the Human Mind (1792), Baillie explicitly refers in the preface to The 
Martyr (a play originally published in 1826). Stewart, however, was one 
of the many literati; among them we we find also Edmund Burke, who 
partook in a debate over Smith’s (Hutcheson’s disciple’s) treatise The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759).8 Of importance, not merely biographi‑
cal, is the fact that Baillie’s father, Reverend James Baillie, was profes‑
sor of divinity at Glasgow at a time when the passions ‑ and sympathy‑
 ‑centred philosophy was at the height of its popularity.9 Given the fact 
that Joanna left Scotland for London at the age of twenty ‑two, following 
the death of her father, we may safely assume that by that time she 
had absorbed some of the intellectual atmosphere of “her Scotts envi‑
ronment” (Armstrong, 56, note 8).10
Besides the larger context of the cultural environment, imbued with 
philosophy, in which Baillie grew up as a thinker and a poet, we have 
internal evidence of Baillie’s absorption of the intellectual atmosphere 
of – to use James Buchan’s phrase – “the Scottish moment of the mind.” 
We have already mentioned Baillie’s use of the term “sympathy.” Let us 
at this point examine what she does with it in the “Introductory Disco‑
urse,” her manifesto, as we might call it, prefixed to the 1798 Plays on 
the  Passions. Here Baillie lays out a broad conceptual context, indeed 
a foundation, for her passions ‑centred drama. As the extended title of 
this volume, which – as we have noted – contains the first three plays, 
informs us, the project of “a series of plays” is about renewed attempts 
“to delineate the stronger passions of the mind.” In the “Discourse” 
Baillie explains that the notion of “sympathetick curiosity towards 
others of our kind” (2001, 69) supplies a foundation for this project. 
 8 The publication that helps us follow the debate is to be found among the works 
cited (see Reeder).
 9 Adam Smith was Professor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow from 1752 to 1763.
10 As a daughter of a Presbyterian minister, Armstrong argues, Baillie was “saturated 
in the culture and intellectual disputes of the Scottish Enlightenment” (Armstrong 2003, 
56, note 8). This sounds convincing, which is not to say that this example of “cultural 
saturation” would not merit further investigation.
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She defines “sympathetick curiosity” as man’s natural “propensity” 
(the word frequently recurs), an innate inclination, in other words, that 
makes us take interest in others, and specifically in what our fellow cre‑
atures think and feel. The epistemological meaning of “this universal 
desire in the human mind to behold man in every situation” (70) ought 
not escape us: sympathetic curiosity is not only a natural but also an 
indispensable cognitive impulse, one which brings us into contact with 
other people.
The philosophy of sympathy, besides the epistemological and moral, 
also has other aspects, among them social and political. In the realm 
of dramatic art, sympathy carries a unique significance, which, howe‑
ver, is to a large extent a reflection of the way sympathy – in the real 
world – is the foundation for interpersonal relationships of different 
orders (familial, communal, national). Unsurprisingly, in her theoreti‑
cal considerations, Baillie foregrounds the metadramatic significance of 
sympathetic curiosity; she calls upon it to explain the universal appeal 
of dramatic art and, as a consequence, to justify her occupation as 
a playwright. The playwright’s task is to trace “the varieties and pro‑
gress of a perturbed soul” (2001, 73) thereby to satisfy this desire, as 
Baillie self ‑consciously does in her plays. This task turns the playwright 
into a practical philosopher, the plays being so many studies in human 
nature (81).11
Baillie is thus intentionally indebted to the idea, expressed among 
other thinkers by Edmund Burke, according to which “our Creator 
has designed we should be united by the bond of sympathy” (42).12
But it is in Adam Smith and his theory of moral sentiments that we find 
(as Baillie did) the term “sympathetic” used systematically as a techni‑
cal term and in the sense in which it is used by Baillie.
According to Smith, “men are naturally sympathetic” (101). As scho‑
lars have repeatedly explained, the Smithan notion of sympathy is 
11 To be consistent, Baillie actually goes a step further and argues for the su‑
premacy of drama over philosophy; drama fleshes out the abstract and dry notions of 
philosophy. 
12 This section of Burke’s tract is entitled “The effects of SYMPATHY in the distres‑
ses of others.” It has been reprinted in Appendix A of Duthie’s edition of Baillie’s 
Plays. 
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a technical term: “In the technical sense, to sympathise with someone is 
to have a feeling which one knows or suspects another person to have, 
and to acquire the feeling by imagining oneself in the very same cir‑
cumstances that we know the other person to be in” (Broadie 1997, 155; 
editor’s note).13 What is more, Smith’s conception of the spectator (as in, 
for instance, this passage: “the sympathetic indignation of the specta‑
tor” (Smith, 98)) prepares the ground for Baillie’s metadramatic employ‑
ment of the notion of sympathy. Indeed, as Alexander Broadie puts it: 
“For Smith, sympathy cannot be detached from spectatorship, for it is 
spectators who sympathise” (Broadie 2006, 158).
That Baillie’s debt to Smith and other Scottish philosophers is not to 
be regarded as an unthinking appropriation becomes obvious if we take 
into consideration her conscious transference of the ideas to the theatri‑
cal medium, with special emphasis placed on dialogue and other than 
verbal types of interaction between characters on the stage. Some scho‑
lars have gone so far as to suggest that Baillie’s project of plays on the 
passions “throws out a challenge to contemporary accounts of the emo‑
tions and particularly to a discourse of sympathy pursued by Adam 
Smith” (Armstrong, 23). We shall return to this assumption in due 
course. Smith certainly institutes sympathy as a transpersonal faculty.14 
This role of sympathy follows logically from the epistemological pre‑
mise with which Smith opens his treatise: “As we have no immediate 
experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of the manner 
in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should 
feel in the like situation” (11). It is thanks to sympathy that we know 
what others feel; it is the sympathetic bond between persons that allows 
for what may be called emotional communication.
What is important for us to note is what role conception grants to the 
imagination. The role played by the imagination in interpersonal (“sym‑
pathetic”) communication is crucial. Not only is the imagination clo‑
13 Broadie suggests that we should “think of sympathy as an adverbial modification 
of a given feeling”: the spectator has another’s feeling sympathetically (Broadie 2006, 164; 
see also 168–9).
14 As Adela Pinch put it: “feelings are transsubjective entities that pass between per‑
sons” (19). Interesting as the reformulation may sound, neither Smith nor Hume speak of 
feelings actually passing from one person to another.
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sely connected with the passions,15 but it also allows us to perform the 
transsubjective leap into the minds of other people. Smith treats at some 
length of the latter function of the imagination. In his view, thanks to the 
imagination we can intuit the mental state of another person. This trans‑
subjective intuition is a function of our minds that makes imagination 
indispensable: “By the imagination we place ourselves in his [another 
man’s] situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, 
we enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure the same 
person with him …” (12). We can be mentally transported as it were bey‑
ond the confines of our particular selves; we can almost become a per‑
son other than ourselves.
In relation to the passions, imagination functions on two different 
levels and in three different ways. On a personal level, the passions 
both influence the imagination and are influenced by it. The philosop‑
hers customarily occupied themselves with either or both of these types 
of influence. For instance, Smith devotes an entire chapter to “passions 
which take their origin from a particular turn or habit of the imagina‑
tion” (the title of I.ii.2). On the interpersonal level, the imagination, in 
the way we have just described, affects a sympathetic link between the 
person under the influence of a particular passion (Smith speaks of the 
“person principally concerned” (25)) and the spectator. All these aspe‑
cts have a moral dimension attached to them. Typically and to return 
to the problem of influence, Dugald Stewart in his Elements  of  the Phi‑
losophy of  the Human Mind sets apart a section of his treatise to discuss 
“the influence of imagination on human character and happiness.” The 
main concern here is the potentially harmful influence that a disorde‑
red imagination can exert on the mind; cautions Stewart, “at length the 
most extravagant dreams of imagination acquire as powerful influence 
in exciting its [the mind’s] passions, as if they were realities” (452).
15 In the words of David Hume, “‘Tis remarkable, that the imagination and affections 
have a close union together, and that nothing, which affects the former, can be entirely 
indifferent to the latter” (1981, 424).
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Passions and Morals
Baillie’s drama is ostensibly occupied with the operation of the pas‑
sions in the mind of an individual person, as well as with their trans‑
mission amongst a community. According to Janice Patten, the real 
action in Baillie’s plays on the passions is “predominantly psycholo‑
gical” (174). Isobel Armstrong, alluding to the medical occupation of 
Baillie’s brother, Dr Matthew Baillie, calls her plays the “anatomy of the 
emotions” (55, note 8). By engaging the then current philosophy of the 
human mind, Baillie inevitably engaged a number of problems this phi‑
losophy addressed, including besides the epistemological dimension of 
sympathy the moral concerns just mentioned.
When speaking of the passions, Smith, as we have seen, singles out 
those which are “derived from the imagination,” and which “take their 
origin from a particular turn or habit of the imagination.” Both love 
and hatred provide appropriate examples. In her plays on the passions, 
Baillie devotes each of these two aseparate tragedy: Count Basil (set in 
Mantua in the sixteenth century, with a military conflict in the backgro‑
und) is a tragedy on love and De Monfort (set in a town in Germany) 
a tragedy on hatred. As regards the underlying moral philosophy, both 
tragedies illustrate and verify Smith’s disapproval of these passions, an 
attitude that is at the same time, a recognition of their strength. Smith 
calls them “disagreeable” and repeatedly stresses the fact that they 
put considerable strain on the sympathetic propensities of the obser‑
ver. As Smith sees it, love, though natural and “pardoned” at a certain 
age, makes it difficult for the impartial spectator to “enter into it,” or to 
fellow ‑feel (38).16 In other words, when we see others moved by these 
strong passions, we also have a sense of the limitations of our capacity 
to fellow ‑feel; there is always some disproportion between, for exam‑
ple, the intensity of love and its actual object (i.e. the loved person); that 
object’s value, assessed impartially, does not justify the strength of the 
affection and so the spectator finds it “disproportioned.” Two functions 
16 Love “is always laughed at, because we cannot enter into it”; and the reason for this 
limited ability to sympathise is that it is “extravagantly disproportioned to the value of 
[its] objects” (Smith, 40).
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of the imagination are in conflict here: the object ‑passion disproportion 
in the mind of the person principally concerned prevents fellow ‑feeling 
in the observer, whose mind cannot enter into the mind of the enamou‑
red or “doting” person.
For reasons that do not seem to require further elucidation, Baillie was 
primarily interested in examining strong as opposed to petty or tran‑
sient passions, especially in her tragedies. As she tells us in the “Disco‑
urse,” strong ones are those that take time to grow and have a capacity 
to take possession of and even devastate the soul. Whether, as some 
critics would have it, this determination in the playwright posed a chal‑
lenge to Smith and other philosophers is debatable. However, Baillie 
must have been aware, if dimly, of the difficulties which this task posed 
for a dramatic artist. First of all, the project involved showing (or “deli‑ 
neating,” as she puts it) the growth of a passion, not just its final or patho‑ 
logical stage. (She censures previous dramatists for their manner of 
limiting their representations of the passions to their most violent out‑
bursts.) Secondly, given the possibility of a successful representation of 
the process whereby a passion gradually takes possession of the soul of 
the protagonist, it will still, because of its vehemence, prevent sympathy, 
and these both in the other figures of the play (on ‑stage spectators) and 
the audience (external spectators). These are serious difficulties, perhaps 
even obstacles, but Baillie does not address them in the “Discourse.”
Moreover, there is the problem of the tragic genre. According to 
Smith, the inordinate strength of some passions obstructs their cre‑
dibility, i.e. makes them implausible: “such passions [derived from the 
imagination], though they may be allowed to be almost unavoidable in 
some part of life, are always, in some measure, ridiculous” (38). Can 
then a tragedian successfully delineate a passion that the spectator (even 
if understood in the Smithan sense of the term) must find ridiculous? 
At this point, we can come up with the assumption that, conscious of 
the difficulty, Baillie simply decided to put a theory of the passions to 
the test of dramaturgy and of theatrical practice. As with any such test, 
however, the results are largely a matter of speculation, because only 
a few of the plays were staged and in the case of those that were (e.g. De
Monfort) we have little direct access to the actual response of Baillie’s 
audiences. What we must chiefly rely on is the text of the plays themselves. 
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 As we shall see, the conclusions we have arrived at are also ridden with 
a degree of ambiguity, also of a moral nature. To make this sound clea‑
rer, we need to take a closer look at the literary material at hand.
In both early tragedies, there is much in the conceptual fabric that 
confirms that Baillie shared Smith’s ambivalent attitude to strong pas‑
sions; love and hate, though natural, are potentially destructive, both on 
the personal and the interpersonal levels.17 In Count Basil, great empha‑
sis is put on the disparity between the way in which the lover, Basil, 
feels about the object of his passion, and how other characters feel about 
him and his love:
Basil. [about Victoria, the woman he dotes on] Long has she been the 
inmate of my breast!/ The smiling angel of my nightly dreams. … Yet, like 
a beauteous vision from the blest,/ Her  form has  oft upon my mind  return’d; 
… (139).18
Here we are made aware of the role played by the imagination in 
giving rise to Basil’s strong affection. At the same time, while strengthe‑
ning his passion, the imaginary component, as we might call it, foreclo‑
ses fellow ‑feeling. To represent this perceptual disparity, Baillie uses an 
onstage spectator; Basil’s friend, Rosinberg, cannot enter into the mind 
of the thus love ‑bewitched companion: “What mean you now? Your 
mind is raving, Basil” (139). A more detached observer allows Baillie 
to describe Basil’s infatuation by means of a telling metaphor: “Earth‑
 ‑kindled fire, which from a  little  spark/ On hidden  fuel feeds its growing 
strength …” (141); Victoria’s father, the Duke of Mantua, who will use 
Basil’s weakness to serve his political ends, is perhaps the most brusque 
in his judgement: “fantastic  fancies bind him thus …” (142). Elsewhere, 
we hear a suggestion that Basil has become slave to “ideal tyranny” 
(147). The word “ideal” occurs here in the then common sense of “ima‑
ginary,” and, according to Duthie, Baillie may be indebted to Mary 
Wollstonecraft’s reflections concerning the fantastic (“ideal”) powers of 
woman over man. This idea is latter echoed by Rosinberg, who finds 
17 Compare Victoria’s lines in Count Basil: “Were human passions plac’d within the 
breast/ But to be curb’d, subdu’d, pluck’d by the roots?” (147).
18 Unless indicated otherwise, emphasis in the quotations has been added.
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Basil “enthralled by a woman,” and suspended over “a yawning gulph/ 
To which blind passion guides [his] heedless steps” (186–7). In return for 
the deficient fellow ‑feeling in a friend, Basil “disowns” him (188).
When disaster struck (Basil jeopardised the success of the military 
campaign and thus disgraced himself as a soldier), he comes to a full 
realisation of his weakness. In an anguished soliloquy that opens Act 
V, he himself employs the image of an abyss of fancy. He conjures up 
a vision of his unburied corpse as the source of a wanderer’s terror, 
fleeing “the horrid place,/ With dark imaginations frightful made,/ The 
haunt of damned spirits” (201). In the terms of the Smithan theory of 
moral sentiments, Basil has rejected the (beneficial) intervention of the 
impartial spectators, which alone could help him mitigate his passion. 
Instead, he has allowed his inflamed fancy to take absolute hold of him, 
which has drawn him into a state of mental desolation. In this state of 
mind, no compassionate fellow ‑feeling can be expected but the imagi‑
nation remains active (as his speeches show), though now as a source of 
torment. His suicide is imminent.
In De Monfort, the tragedy on hate, we unsurprisingly also find lines 
(perhaps even more sinister in tone) that point towards similar emotio‑
nal and moral predicaments. The title hero ‑villain’s speech hints at the 
difficulty in intuiting someone’s passions because of their entanglement 
with mental “content” that is impenetrable to a bystander (spectator):
De Mon. That man was never born whose secret soul/ With all its motley 
treasure of dark thoughts,/ Foul fantasies, vain musings, and wild dreams,/ Was 
open’d to another’s scan. (314)
“Dark thoughts,” “foul fantasies,” “vain musings,” and “wild dreams” 
lie on the periphery of the real world and as such forestall the opera‑
tion of sympathy. Baillie, however, programmatically seeks to bring this 
murky peripheral stuff into the open space of the stage. The impres‑
sion is that, in comparison with Count Basil, in De Monfort she proceeds 
more self ‑consciously. Here the main role in the explorations of the 
powers and limitations of sympathy is performed by Jane De Monfort, 
the hero’s sister, the main and model sympathetic spectator in the play. 
In reply (albeit not a direct one) to her brother’s scepticism expressed in 
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the lines just quoted, she offers what we may call an emotional therapy 
(described as “driving forth” wild and potentially criminal “fantasies”):
I’ll stay by thee, I’ll cheer thee, comfort thee:/ Peruse with thee the 
study of some art,/ Or nobler science, that compels the mind/ To steady 
thought progressive, driving forth/ All floating, wild, unhappy fantasies;/ Till 
thou, with brow unclouded, smil’st again,/ Like one who from dark visions 
of  the night,/ When th’ active soul within  its  lifeless cell/ Holds  its own world, 
with dreadful  fancy press’d/ Of some dire,  terrible,  or murd’rous deed,/ Wakes 
to some dawning morn, and blesses heaven. (330)
What hints at the self ‑conscious quality of De Monfort is Baillie’s use of 
the term “sympathy” in contexts that point up its technical meaning and 
its possible therapeutic function, both of which have their equivalent, 
and possibly a direct source, in Smith’s treatise. We shall return to this 
presently. At the same time, as we have suggested, Baillie goes beyond 
philosophical perspicacity and sets herself the daring task of handling 
a passion that is “darker” than love, more directly ruinous (to the per‑
son principally concerned, the hater), and antisocial; De Monfort’s hate 
poses a real threat to its object, a man called Rezenvelt.
Among the functions that Smith has devised for the impartial spe‑
ctator is that of bringing down the violence of one’s passions, which 
I believe justifies our use of the word “therapeutic,” even though we 
won’t find it in his treatise. Of the unsocial passions, such as hatred, 
Smith has this to say: “before we can enter into them, or regard them 
as graceful or becoming, they must always be brought down to a pitch 
much lower than that to which undisciplined nature would raise 
them” (41). This bringing down is a condition for a successful opera‑
tion of sympathy; if the person principally concerned (De Monfort) 
is to expect the impartial spectator (his sister Jane) to fellow ‑feel his 
hatred, he needs to bring it down to a lower pitch to make it possible 
for that other person to enter into it. Baillie clearly constructed the cha‑
racter of Jane De Monfort in such as way as to make her an ideal or 
model spectator.19 Jane is described as an angel in human form: “Jane 
19 The term “ideal spectator” appears in Part III of Smith’s treatise. The impartiality 
of the Smithan spectator must not be misconceived as indifference. Jane’s sisterly love of 
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De Monfort is not mortal woman” (337). She offers her brother unboun‑
ded and unconditional love and, as we have seen, proposes to help him 
curb his distempered imagination, which fuels his hatred. The question 
is: will she succeed in helping her brother to tone down the pitch of his 
hatred?
Baillie’s dramatic employment and critical exploration of the then cur‑
rent philosophy is conspicuous in the way she weaves “sympathy” into 
the stage dialogue. Already in the first scene of the play, De Monfort’s 
servant comments on the bizarre ways of his master saying that the 
“gloomy sternness in his eye … sullenly repels all sympathy” (305). This 
remark, it will be noted, hints at the key problem of the play, not only 
conceptual but also theatrical: a protagonist who “repels all sympathy” 
may not be a proper vehicle for the cathartic purgation of emotions that 
the genre of tragedy demands.20 Another significant occurrence of “sym‑
pathy” is found in the scene, already discussed, in which Jane offers her 
brother emotional therapy. In reply, De Monfort sums up the major crux 
of the tragedy: “thou wilt despise me./ For in my breast a raging passion 
burns,/ To which  thy  soul  no  sympathy  will  own./ A passion which hath 
made my nightly couch/ A place of torment; …” (331). The difficulty is, 
first of all, of a moral nature; as we have seen, a model spectator, such 
as Jane, will not share a passion that is both unjustified and inordinately 
vehement. De Monfort seems to know this, and the realisation adds to 
his torment and possibly makes his figure tragic in the pedestrian sense 
of the word; the odd mental alliance between his passions and his ima‑
gination turns him into a victim (as much as the man he kills). We have 
here an either ‑or situation: either De Monfort brings down the pitch of 
his hatred to allow the impartial spectator sympathetically to enter into 
her brother does not stand in opposition to her fulfilling the role of the impartial specta‑
tor in the Smithan understanding of the term.
20 Here, without being able to dwell on the subject, we need to note that the relation of 
sympathy to the tragic catharsis was raised by Hume in his correspondence with Smith 
following the publication of The Theory of Moral Sentiments (see Reeder, already mentio‑
ned in a footnote above). The opening of Hume’s essay “Of Tragedy” is worth recalling: 
“It seems an unaccountable pleasure which the spectators of a well ‑written tragedy rece‑
ive from sorrow, terror, anxiety, and other passions that are in themselves disagreeable 
and uneasy” (2008, 126). 
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it, or Jane will somehow engender in her mind the same violent hatred 
for the object of De Monfort’s. Both are impossibilities; the first would 
mean cancelling the catastrophic violence of De Monfort’s hatred, the 
second compromising Jane’s righteousness.
We can see clearly that the theoretical problems that the plays raise 
have a theatrical equivalent, to which we turn in order to examine the 
implications that the philosophy of sympathy had for Baillie’s dramas 
as acting plays.
A Theatre of Tragic Passions
Verbal, and specifically conceptual, content is naturally only a part of 
any drama; its role depends on the overall conception of drama to which 
a playwright subscribes. Baillie’s plays give the impression of spoken 
plays, which is in part what the idea of legitimate drama is all about. 
Yet, as we have pointed out, Baillie herself insisted on the importance 
of stage action. Unlike some romantics, Baillie wrote “acting plays” and 
her plays on the passions were written for the stage,21 and indeed, in her 
project, the non ‑verbal component of dramatic action, the stage business, 
as we might call it, acquires special significance.22 We shall now enquire 
into the modes of representation she thought to be fit vehicles for the 
issues she addressed in her plays on the passions.
Not all of Baillie’s plays were staged, and the stagings of those that 
were, such as De  Monfort (performed first in 1800 and then revived 
several times) were not received with enthusiasm (she herself used the 
word “feeble” to describe the reception). To some extent, the way Bail‑
lie formulates her project and even the few lines from her plays quoted 
so far allow us to see a part of the problem she had to confront. 
Her theatre was to be a theatre of dark passions, depicting and studying 
21 Writes Judith Slagle: “for she states consistently in her letters that these were to be 
‘acting plays’” (82). Baillie complained of the staging conditions in the London theatres 
of her time as unfavourable to the non ‑verbal content of her plays (the mime, etc.), chiefly 
due to the great distance between the actor and the audience.
22 I have discussed this aspect of Baillie’s drama in a recently published essay: Mydla 
2009.
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half ‑realised, half ‑concealed desires expressing themselves in gloomy 
imaginings. The tragedies show protagonists whose emotional sta‑
tes (“strong passions”) repel fellow ‑feeling and banish them from the 
society of men. What were the means which she wished to use for her 
purposes?
There is no indication that Baillie attached special significance to stage 
design as a means to throw light into the hidden recesses of the souls 
of her protagonists; she must have regarded their behaviour as capable 
of performing this revelatory function. A dramatic character’s behaviour 
is either verbal (dialogue, soliloquy) or nonverbal, both the behaviour 
that is explicitly described in the playtext (by means of stage directions) 
and the behaviour that is described and suggested in what is said on the 
stage. In her “Introductory Discourse,” Baillie stresses the significance 
of the soliloquy, which confirms what we have said about the revelatory 
function she attached to language, or the verbal behaviour of the charac‑
ters. She calls soliloquies “those overflowings of the perturbed soul, in 
which it unburthens itself of those thoughts, which it cannot communicate 
to others …” (105). Clearly, however, Baillie overlooks here the larger 
context and the problem that has to do with emotional interaction. That 
her Basils and De Monforts cannot share their passions with the other 
characters is evident; we have examined the reasons as we find them 
stipulated in Smith’s theory of sympathy. The passions have grown to 
a point at which they have isolated the protagonists even from their clo‑
sest and most sympathetic fellow creatures. The question that we need 
to ask is: have these protagonists been isolated also from the audience? 
Apparently, Baillie is confident that spectators can keep them company 
even in their darkest moments.
Baillie certainly goes a long way to help the audience comprehend 
the state of mind of her perturbed protagonists. The simplest means is 
to use descriptive language. In De Monfort, from the outset, i.e. before 
De Monfort’s appearance on the stage, we are told what to expect. 
We are informed of how his behaviour has changed lately: he has been an 
“alter’d man,” “difficult, capricious, and distrustful”; “sullen, haughty, 
ungracious” (304). We hear that “something disturbs his mind” (305). 
At the same time, as we have seen, we are warned that his sullen 
manner “repels all sympathy” (305). Indeed, the effectiveness of Baillie’s 
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treatment of hatred consists in the way in which this passion makes the 
hero into an outcast. When we first see him, the stage directions des‑
cribe him as “thoughtful” and given to outbursts that we put down to 
bad temper.
The situation becomes strenuous when De Monfort discovers that 
the man whom he regards as his mortal enemy, Rezenvelt, has come 
to the same town. This is a moment when Baillie lays stronger empha‑
sis on non ‑verbal behaviour. When De Monfort first hears the news, his 
nonverbal behaviour makes conspicuous what his language would be 
powerless to conceal: he “starts from his seat, and lets the cup fall from 
his hand” (312). Indeed, unhampered expression comes only when he 
is alone, i.e. observed only by the spectators. In this moment, his vio‑
lent manner corresponds to the violent language he uses in the accom‑
panying soliloquy: “gives loose to all the fury of gesture, and walks up 
and down in great agitation” (313, stage directions). The problem, as 
we have suggested (and the playtext also hints at), is that the audience 
are to a large extent prevented from exercising their sympathetic pro‑
pensity; we do not see what De Monfort’s strong hatred can possibly be 
based on (“Hell hath no greater torment for th’ accurs’d/ Than this man’s 
presence gives –”); we have not yet even seen the object of this passion. 
And when we have, we do not find much in the man that would justify 
the way De Monfort feels about him.23
When finally confronted with Rezenvelt (De Monfort seems to have 
developed some extra sense which allows him to hear his approach even 
before others do! – Byron’s favourite moment in the play), De Monfort 
cannot overcome his physical revulsion. Rezenvelt runs to him “with 
open arms” and an offer of reconciliation, but De Monfort “shrinks back 
from him” (345). Scenes like this create a palpable difference between 
how De Monfort feels about the object of his hatred and how we, i.e. the 
spectators, do; we have no grounds to hate Rezenvelt, nor  is  it  possible 
for us to fellow ‑feel with De Monfort. This emotive disharmony between 
the psyche of the main protagonist (now slave to a strong passion) and 
the spectators, who – like De Monfort’s sister – have limited access to 
23 For this reason, i.e. to supply De Monfort with more justification for the way he 
feels about his “enemy,” the play was reworked extensively before it was performed.
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the workings and contents of his imagination and who are not emo‑
tionally capable of keeping him company is not something that Bail‑
lie envisaged in her project. Indeed, a study of the tragedies, such as 
that attempted in this article, shows that, rather than explorations of the 
growth of strong passions, the plays are in fact explorations of the limi‑
tations of our sympathetic propensities. To rephrase this in the terms 
of Aristotelian poetics, while in classical tragedy we are expected and 
given a chance to experience cathartic purgation (due to our unham‑ 
pered emotional involvement in the plight of the protagonist), in Baillie 
we remain tightly fixed in our position of judges, i.e. the impartial spec‑
tators of Smith’s theory of moral sentiments.
The worry for the verbal texture of the plays is that the language, and 
especially the speeches of the protagonist, cease to be the vehicles for 
emotional or imaginative response. In this sense, the poetry hovers over 
a mental void. When, further in the play, De Monfort dreams of being 
an outcast “upon some desert coast” (353), this dream can hardly elicit 
our pity, if that was Baillie’s goal. At the same time, he may terrify us 
with his murderous fantasising. Here he is thinking of a fitting place in 
which to carry out his bloody design: “That ’midst the murky darkness 
I might strike;/ As in the wild confusion of a dream,/ Things horrid, 
bloody, terrible, do pass,/ As tho’ they pass’d not; …” (361). Lines like 
these may be read as an Baillie’s attempt to create a proper setting for 
an action that is at once real (Rezenvelt will soon get killed, albeit off‑
stage) and mental (De Monfort wades in his horrid imaginings). Howe‑
ver, because Baillie does not put the source or cause of the passion she 
“delineates” in the external circumstances, the “action” takes place in 
the mind of the main protagonist. There may be more to her decision 
to remove the actual killing to an offstage space than a wish to observe 
decorum. The mind of her hero is also largely an offstage world, now 
virtually inaccessible to the audience.
As we have seen, simultaneously with the object of De Monfort’s 
hate, Baillie introduces De Monfort’s sister, Jane, whose function – if we 
might speculate about Baillie’s authorial intention – would consist in 
mediating between the stage and the audience. But, if this was indeed 
Baillie’s motive in devising this particular character, then as we have 
argued, Jane could fulfil this mediating function only to a very limited 
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extent. To be more precise, she can and does act as a sympathetic spec‑
tator in the common sense of “sympathy,” but she cannot fellow ‑feel in 
the technical, Smithan sense. Similarly and for the same reasons, there 
are limitations on the degree to which Baillie’s plays on the passions 
satisfy the “sympathetic curiosity” in the audience. As we have argued, 
there is an antagonism between the conceptual and theatrical aspects 
of Baillie’s preoccupation with the passions, a tension that arises out of 
her debt to the philosophy of the mind. On the one hand, it is the ima‑
gination (as the tool of our sympathetic curiosity) that helps us to enter 
into and know the minds of the protagonists, that is, chiefly their pas‑
sions as the basic motivational and actuating force. On the other hand, 
the working of the imagination in her protagonists is doomed to remain 
a mystery to the audience. The tragedies lead us where we cannot and 
perhaps even should not follow. For even though Baillie makes an effort 
to “delineate” the progress of a strong passion, such as love or hatred, 
we are still left with a keen sense of the incomprehensible or, to use 
a better word, impenetrable (“the unknown, the unbounded, the unfath‑ 
omable”). Smith’s philosophy explains why this is so.
It is then difficult to say what type of response Baillie had in mind 
when she spoke of the theatre as a school of morals (“Drama improves 
us by the knowledge we acquire of our own minds” (2001, 90)). Smith 
explains why the impartial spectator cannot enter into a mind that is 
actuated by passions which are unreasonably strong and which for this 
reason may be destructive or – as in the case of De Monfort – criminal. 
The alternatives that have presented themselves are two, but neither, 
I am afraid, would have made the playwright feel comfortable about 
her project: either Baillie wants us to fellow ‑feel with her protagonists 
(which would mean that we should share, for instance, De Monfort’s 
homicidal hatred) or expects us to feel, as it were, against them. If we 
were to remain impartial and pass judgement on the protagonists (and 
actually fellow ‑feel with those they alienate and harm), we would need 
to rein in our sympathetic propensity and perhaps rely on apathy rather 
than sympathy.
There is no one satisfying solution to the problems that Baillie’s project 
raises when confronted with the content of the plays. There are concep‑
tual inconsistencies and there is what we might describe as emotional 
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turmoil. She may have been too philosophic about playwriting and the 
theatre; after all, a good play will never be another philosophic treatise. 
She may have been too “romantic” and thus not philosophic enough 
in her wholehearted poetic dedication to the passions and the imagi‑
nation. There is little doubt, no matter which of these two suppositions 
is closer to the truth, that in approaching Baillie’s plays and the theo‑
retical discourse that accompanies them we encounter an imagination 
that has the capacity to spellbind and an intellect that has the power to 
intrigue.
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